

ARTICLE ATTACHED

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# RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND AMERICAN ACADEMICS

● Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, one of the great tragedies of the 1960's and 1970's was the withdrawal, by American academics, of cooperation with the analytic arms of U.S. intelligence. This country produces some of the finest research and writing on foreign countries and foreign policy that the world has ever seen. American academics, with their fine training and years of experience, frequently develop expertise on particular countries that no intelligence organization can match, despite its access to secret sources.

U.S. intelligence agencies want and need the help of academic experts. They need the "reality check" that an outside expert can provide by critiquing their analyses. They need the fresh ideas that an outsider can inject into the intelligence process. Often, because of personnel turnover, they need the basic guidance that a seasoned expert can provide to get a new analyst off to a good start.

Intelligence is a vital part of the policy process. Academics should be proud to help make the policy process more rational by ensuring that it is based upon the best possible information and analysis.

American academics, in turn, need some things from U.S. intelligence agencies. They need the freedom to state their views without censorship—except as required to delete sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other classified information. They need enough insulation from the operational side of U.S. intelligence that their cooperation with analysts will not lessen their ability to conduct research in foreign countries. And they need the right and encouragement to be forthright with their employers and the public regarding any financial support received from U.S. agencies.

The recent case of Nadav Safran, a truly distinguished professor at Harvard University who was faulted for not disclosing CIA support for an academic conference, illustrates very well both our need for academics to help U.S. intelligence and the need to guard against accidental harm to those academics and to free academic enquiry everywhere. Professor Safran exemplifies the type of insightful scholar who can really make a difference by applying his rigorous analytic approach to problems of U.S. intelligence. His resignation as director of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies is a good example of the harm that can come from keeping the service to his country so secret that it offends scholarly canons or university rules.

The CIA has learned from this case; they are both changing their rules regarding contracts with academics and reaching out to the academic community to exchange views on this issue. Recently, the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, Robert M. Gates, presented the CIA's latest position in a thoughtful address at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. His discussion may not be the last word, but it is well worth reading. Both the CIA and the Select Committee on Intelligence would be most interested in hearing the reactions of American scholars, for we are serious when we say that America needs their contributions to the intelligence and policy processes.

Mr. President, I ask that the text of Mr. Gate's address on "CIA and the University" be printed in the RECORD. The address follows:

## CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

I welcome this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency, especially its analytical/research arm, and the academic community. Recent events here have again sparked broad discussion of both the propriety and wisdom of university scholars cooperating in any way with American intelligence. On December 3rd of last year the Boston Globe stated: "The scholar who works for a government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar." These are strong words. In my view they are absolutely wrong. Nonetheless, there are real concerns that should be addressed.

My remarks tonight center on two simple propositions:

First, preserving the liberty of this nation is fundamental to and prerequisite for the preservation of academic freedom: the university community cannot prosper and protect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the fortunes of the nation.

Second, in defending the nation and our liberties, the Federal Government needs to have recourse to the best minds in the country, including those in the academic community. Tensions inevitably accompany the relationship between defense, intelligence and academe, but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or elimination of such tensions.

## THE HISTORY OF CIA-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS

In discussing the relationship between the academic community and American intelligence, and specifically the research and analysis side of intelligence, it is important to go back to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links to Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan persuaded President Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving world events. He proposed that the service "draw on the universities for experts with long foreign experience and specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and created the Office of the Coordinator of Information, later renamed the Office of Special Services, under Donovan's leader-

ship. The ship, The L. L. Langley, was recruited as the Director of Research and he in turn, recruited some of the finest scholars in America for the OSS, many of them from Harvard, Yale, and Columbia Universities.

When CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947, this pattern was repeated. Langer returned to establish the Board of National Estimates. Robert Amory of the Harvard Law School faculty was named CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1952, and served in that capacity for nearly ten years. Other academicians who joined included: Historians such as Ludwell Montague, Sherman Kent, Joseph Strayer and DeForrest Van Slyck; economist Max Millikan, who organized the economic intelligence effort; economist Richard Bissell, who later headed the clandestine service; and even William Sloane Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to join CIA for the duration of the Korean War before becoming Chaplain at Yale. He is quoted as recalling that he joined the Agency because "Safran made Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a common reason for academicians to join the Agency in the early years.

Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war at its height and faculty or students rarely questioned the nation's need for the Agency and its activities. Some of the most noted university professors of the time served on a regular basis as unpaid consultants, helping CIA to form its estimates of probable trends in world politics.

These halcyon days were soon to change. There was some criticism on campuses over CIA's involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961. But the real deterioration in relations between CIA and the academe paralleled the wrenching divisions in the country over the Vietnam War, despite continuing academic cooperation with the Directorate of Intelligence. The decline in CIA-academe ties accelerated with the February 1967 disclosure in Ramparts magazine that CIA had been funding the foreign activities of the National Student Association for a number of years.

Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA became more frequent in the media in the early 1970s culminating the establishment of the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both the Church Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives.

Even the Church Committee, however, so critical of other intelligence activities, recognized that CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce." The Committee recommended that academic advice and judgment of academics be openly sought. The Committee concluded that the principal responsibility for setting the terms of the relationship between CIA and academe should rest with college administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of . . . the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members."

This paralleled considerable debate within academic ranks and numerous articles about the relationship between the universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President of the American Association of University Professors, then CIA Director

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